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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Arturo Salinas appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction
relief, contending that there were genuine issues of material fact that supported his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Alternatively, he asserts that the district court
improperly discredited his evidence for lack of proper certification and affirmation of
truthfulness. In the further alternative, he asserts that the district court failed to give him
any notice that his affidavits would not be considered because the certification or
affirmation of truth was lacking.

Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing

Mr. Salinas's petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Salinas pied guilty to the use of a deadly weapon during the commission of
an aggravated battery.

(Tr., p.10, Ls.1-4.)

The district court imposed upon him a

unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed.

(R., p.5.)

Four days after

receiving the sentence, Mr. Salinas contacted his attorney, seeking a sentence
reduction. (R., pp.126-127.) An Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion
was filed and the district court denied it approximately 22 days after the judgment of
conviction was filed. (R., p.45.) Mr. Salinas did not appeal the judgment of conviction
or the denial of his Rule 35 motion. (R., p.5.)
Mr. Salinas raised a number of claims in his timely verified petition for postconviction relief. (R., pp.4-7.) Relevant to the issue raised in this appeal, Mr. Salinas
asserted that "Counsel was ineffective when he did not seek to file an appeal of the
sentence imposed; nor did he even speak to [Mr. Salinas] regarding the possibility of
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filing an appeal of the sentence imposed." 1 (R., pp.5-6.) The district court appointed
counsel to represent Mr. Salinas on the claims involving his appellate rights. (R., pp.4557.)
The State filed a motion for summary dismissal, seeking dismissal of
Mr. Salinas's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for his attorney's
failure to consult with him about an appeal and to file an appeal. (R., pp.58-67.) The
State asserted that Mr. Salinas never stated that he requested an appeal and that
because the district court advised him of his rights to appeal the court's decision,
Mr. Salinas's claims should be dismissed for failing to raise a genuine issue of material
fact. (R., pp.64-66.)
In his response, Mr. Salinas asserted that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his attorney did not file an appeal nor did the attorney consult with him
about filing an appeal. (R., pp.91-92.) Mr. Salinas signed the response and provided
an oath to its truthfulness.

(R., p.93.)

Additionally, Mr. Salinas filed an affidavit

asserting that the public defender's office represented him and he contacted his

Mr. Salinas raised a number of other claims: (1) the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction; (2) the sentence violated double jeopardy; (3) he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his attorney advised him to plead to a sentence that
violated double jeopardy; (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
attorney told him that the weapon enhancement would be dismissed; (5) his conviction
violated due process because the State was allowed to dismiss and refile charges; and
(6) he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to move to
dismiss the charges. (R., pp.4-7, 8-30.) The district court provided its notice of intent to
dismiss these claims. (R., pp.45-57.) After waiting the requisite time period, the district
court dismissed the claims for which it had provided notice. (R., pp.99-110.) Mr. Salinas
does not raise any issues about the claims the district court dismissed in its
December 12, 2012 order.
1

2

attorney immediately after his sentencing hearing "to appeal and [to] file a motion to
reduce [his] sentence." (R., p.116.)
The State filed a supplemental motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.123-127.)
In it, the State argued that because the district court advised the petitioner of his right to
appeal, the attorney had no duty to consult with the petitioner. (R., p.123.) The State
also called into question the believability of Mr. Salinas' affidavit that he asked his
attorney to file the appeal. (R., p.142.)
In support of its request for dismissal, the State produced an affidavit of trial
counsel, Craig Stevely. (R., pp.126-127.) Although the affidavit contained hearsay, it
revealed that Mr. Salinas was not satisfied with the court's sentence imposed upon him
and he requested that his attorney file something to reduce his sentence. (R., pp.126127.) Pursuant to this phone call received at the public defender's office, Mr. Steveley
filed a Rule 35 Motion the same day the judgment was filed with the court. (R., pp.126127; see also Register of Actions of underlying criminal file attached as Appendix A.)
Mr. Stevely asserted that Mr. Salinas never requested an appeal. 2 (R., pp.126-127.)
Mr. Steveley did not deny that he failed to consult with Mr. Salinas about whether to file
an appeal. (See R., pp.126-127.)
The district court summarily dismissed Mr. Salinas' claims that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney neither consulted with him about
an appeal nor filed an appeal on his behalf.

2

(R., pp.128-136.)

The district court

This statement is hearsay because Mr. Steveley received second hand information
about what Mr. Salinas' wishes were about the sentence imposed when Mr. Salinas
contacted the public defender's office four days after the sentence was imposed.
(R., pp.126-127.)
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concluded that no material issue of fact existed as to whether counsel's performance
was deficient and whether the deficiency prejudices petitioner's case; therefore,
dismissed Mr. Salinas' petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.136-137.) Mr. Salinas
timely appealed. (R., pp.138-140.)

4

ISSUES
1)

Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Salinas' petition for post-conviction
relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing on his claim that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to file an appeal on his
behalf and failed to consult with him about an appeal?

2)

Did the district court err when it failed to find that Mr. Salinas submitted
admissible evidence for consideration of his claims?

3)

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Salinas' post-conviction
claims on grounds for which he was given no prior notice?

5

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Salinas' Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief Without Conducting An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That He Received
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When His Attorney Failed To File An Appeal On His
Behalf And Failed To Consult With Him About An Appeal
A.

Introduction
Mr. Salinas asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed his

claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to file
an appeal on his behalf and failed to consult with him about an appeal. In his pleadings,
Mr. Salinas asserted that his attorney failed to consult with him about whether to file an
appeal and alleged that he told his attorney to file an appeal on his behalf. 3 Because
there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Mr. Salinas' counsel was
ineffective, Mr. Salinas respectfully requests that the district court's order summarily
dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel claims be vacated, with this case
remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.

B.

Applicable Legal Standards

1.

Summary Dismissal Standards

An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State,
138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified

As will be explained in Issue II, the district court erred when
Mr. Salinas' affidavits and pleadings and gave them no
alternative, if this Court finds reason to believe the record,
were not sufficiently certified, then, as will be explained in
entitled to notice before dismissing his claims on this ground.
3
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it erroneously discredited
weight.
In the further
affidavits, and pleadings
Issue Ill, Mr. Salinas is

with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. The
application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations,
or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id.
The court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief when the
court is satisfied the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by
further proceedings. I.C. § 19-4906(b). In considering summary dismissal in a case
where evidentiary facts are not disputed, summary dismissal may be appropriate,
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be
responsible for resolving the conflict between the inferences. See State v. Yakovac, 145
Idaho 437, 444 (2008) (addressing case where the State did not file a response to the
petition) (citing Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519 (1982) (addressing
case with stipulated facts).) However, where the facts are disputed, a court is required
to accept the petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true, but need not accept the
petitioner's conclusions. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).
Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if there exists a
material issue of fact. I.C. § 19-4906. When genuine issues of material fact exist that, if
resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to relief, summary
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.

Baldwin v.

State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008).
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court
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determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903
(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de nova. Owen v.
State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997).

C.

The District Court Applied An Incorrect Standard To Conflicting Affidavits At The
Summary Dismissal Stage
At the summary dismissal hearing, the district court demonstrated that it had an

incorrect understanding of post-conviction standards.

(Tr.03/07/2013, p.11, Ls.3-14.)

When the petitioner's attorney articulated the correct standard in that the facts should
be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, at summary dismissal the
district court said that was "not actually required" and that a different standard applied.
(Tr.03/07/2013, p.11, Ls.3-14.)

The district court applied an incorrect standard for

summary dismissal.
"Disputed facts should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the
non-moving party."

Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 144, 145 (2009) (emphasis added).

Disputed facts must be construed in favor of the non-moving party, however, '"[w]hen an
action is to be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not constrained to draw
inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment but rather the
trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from
uncontroverted evidentiary facts."'

Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (quoting Loomis v.

City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437 (1991)) (emphasis added).
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This rule was taken from the prior civil case of Loomis v. City of Hailey. Loomis,
in turn, dealt with a case in which the parties stipulated to the fact that there were no
genuine issues of material fact - only questions of how the law should apply to the facts
that were agreed upon by all parties. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 437.
In Yakovac, the underlying operative facts were not in dispute by the parties, as
they involved trial counsel's failure to make certain evidentiary objections - the absence
of which was apparent from the face of the trial record. Id. at 444-447. Thus, this rule
from both Yakovac and Loomis arose out of, and is expressly limited to, only those
cases where there is no disputed evidence regarding the issue to be determined by the
trial court for summary disposition purposes.
The district court's understanding of the standard to be applied at summary
dismissal was incorrect. The court erred when it did not view the disputed facts in the
light most favorable to Mr. Salinas. As will be explained further below, applying the
correct standard, Mr. Salinas is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

D.

A Material Issue Of Fact Exists On Whether Mr. Steveley Rendered Deficient
Performance When He Failed To File A Timely Notice Of Appeal On Mr. Salinas'
Behalf And Failed To Adequately Consult With Mr. Salinas About Filing An
Appeal
Mr. Salinas raised two claims involving his right to receive effective assistance of

counsel involving his appellate rights.

(R., pp.6-7.)

Mr. Steveley's failure to file an appeal.

(R., pp.6-7.)

His first claim involved
The second involved

Mr. Steveley's failure to consult with him about filing an appeal. (R., pp.6-7.)
The State moved on a general basis for summary dismissal because it believed
Mr. Salinas asserted no material issue of fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing.
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(R., pp.58-67.)

The State asserted that Mr. Salinas never requested an appeal.

(R., p.65.) Additionally, the State gave notice that it wanted Mr. Salinas' claim that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to consult with him
about his appellate rights dismissed. (R., pp.64-65.) Contrary to case law, the State
argued that there is no duty to consult with the defendant about his appellate rights,
especially when the district court advised a defendant that it has the right to an appeal.
(R., pp.64-65.)
The State then filed a supplemental notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.122-127.)
Again, the State moved on a general basis for dismissal because no genuine issue of
material fact existed and the claim that Mr. Salinas wanted an appeal filed was "patently
false." (R., p.122.) Modifying its previous assertion that no duty existed to consult with
Mr. Salinas about his appellate rights, the State reasoned that because Mr. Salinas
received a more favorable deal than negotiated and the court advised him about his
appellate rights, the attorney was not ineffective for failing to consult with Mr. Salinas.
(R., pp.122-127.) The State concluded by asking the court to disbelieve Mr. Salinas'
affidavit, give all weight to Mr. Steveley's affidavit, and dismiss the petition. (R., pp.123124.)
The district court determined that Mr. Steveley did not render deficient
performance.

(R., pp.133-134.) After discrediting all of Mr. Salinas' pleadings, 4 the

court concluded that that Mr. Salinas never spoke with his trial attorney about filing an
appeal, never requested an appeal be filed, nor reasonably conveyed that he was

4

The district court's error is further elaborated on in Issue II.
10

interested in pursuing an appeal.

(R., pp.133-134.)

The district court concluded no

genuine issue of material fact existed. (R., pp.128-135.)
The district court's decision to summarily dismiss Mr. Salinas' petition for postconviction relief should be reversed because a genuine issue of material fact exists as
to whether Mr. Salinas received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney
failed to file an appeal and failed to consult with him about his appellate rights.

1.

Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Standards

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant
in a criminal case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of
counsel. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). Further, the

Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685.
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on
the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the
Amendment envisions." Id. The "proper measure of attorney performance remains
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. In light of the Sixth
Amendment's reliance upon the legal profession's standards, the Idaho Supreme Court
has stated that the starting point of evaluating criminal defense counsel's conduct is the
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American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function.

Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,279 (1998).
In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also
must prove that he was prejudiced. "The defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by
Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established
by a preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal
proceeding would have been different, that decision would be
"diametrically different," "opposite in character or nature," and "mutually
opposed" to our clearly established precedent because we held in
Strickland that the prisoner need only demonstrate a "reasonable
probability that · ·· the result of the proceeding would have been different."

Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696).
Despite the general rule, a presumption of prejudice arises in certain instances.
This presumption applies when there is a complete denial of counsel during a critical
stage of the proceedings, when circumstances are such that the likelihood that any
lawyer could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is
appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial, and when counsel entirely
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. See e.g., United

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).
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2.

A Material Issue Of Fact Exists On Whether Mr. Salinas Instructed His
Attorney To File An Appeal

"The decision whether to prosecute an appeal rests with the defendant." Mata v.
State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993). Idaho courts have repeatedly recognized

that, "where a criminal defendant advises his attorney of his desire to appeal, and the
attorney fails to take the necessary steps to file an appeal, such a defendant has been
denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at a critical stage."
Flores v. State, 104 Idaho 191, 194-195 (Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, the United States

Supreme Court has, "long held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions to file
a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable." Roe v. FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000). Counsel does not make a strategic decision as to

whether to file an appeal. Id. Rather, "filing a notice of appeal is a purely ministerial
task, and the failure to file reflect[s] inattention to the defendant's wishes." Id. Thus, in a
post-conviction proceeding, the question is whether the defendant conveyed to his
attorney that he wanted an appeal or the attorney understood that an appeal should be
undertaken. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940 (Ct. App. 1990).
The question presented in these types of cases is often whether the petitioner
conveyed to his attorney a desire to file an appeal. In Sanders, a case that proceeded
to an evidentiary hearing, the question was whether Sanders had told his attorney to file
an appeal to challenge the sentence imposed. Id. The attorney testified that he could
not recall being instructed to file an appeal and a second attorney, representing the
petitioner during a sentence reduction proceeding, testified that the petitioner never
mentioned filing an appeal nor inquired about his appeal. Id.

Therefore, the district

court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the petitioner
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conveyed to his attorney that he wanted an appeal filed.

Id.

The Court of Appeals

determined that the case presented a credibility determination and that sufficient
evidence existed at the evidentiary hearing to support the district court's findings. Id. at
941.
Like the instant case, in a number of other Court of Appeals' cases, the district
courts failed to recognize that a genuine issue of material fact existed. For example, in
Mata, the Court of Appeals found that the petitioner's verified petition for post-conviction

relief asserting that his attorney declined to file an appeal on the petitioner's behalf was
sufficient to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Mata, 124 Idaho 588,
593 (Ct. App. 1993). The case was remanded for the determination of whether Mata
asked for an appeal to be filed. Id.

In Ricca v. State, the petitioner asserted, in his

petition, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to
file an appeal despite his requests that one be filed. Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894 (Ct.
App. 1993).

The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court for an

evidentiary hearing because a genuine issue of material fact existed. Id. The question
to be decided was whether the petitioner communicated his intent to appeal to his
attorney. Id. at 898. The court recognized that both the petitioner and the attorney may
be called to testify at the evidentiary hearing to resolve the dispute before the district
court. Id.
Unlike Flores, Mata, and Ricca, supra, in State v. Beasley, a remand was
unnecessary for the district court's factual determination of whether the defendant had
made known to counsel his desire to appeal because it was undisputed that the
petitioner had conveyed his desire to appeal and his attorneys understood that the
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petitioner wanted an appeal filed. State v. Beasley, 126 Idaho 356, 360 (Ct. App. 1994).
Therefore, no evidentiary hearing was required on the deficient performance prong of
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim that his attorney should have understood that
the petitioner wanted an appeal filed. Id.
In the instant case, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
Mr. Salinas instructed Mr. Steveley to file an appeal on his behalf.

In his petition for

post-conviction relief, Mr. Salinas asserted that his attorney did not file an appeal on his
behalf, and he specified the non-frivolous issue that may have been raised, i.e.,
sentencing. (R., pp.6-7.) In further pleadings, Mr. Salinas noted that his attorney did
not file an appeal on his behalf to challenge the sentence imposed. (R., p.92.) Finally,
Mr. Salinas produced an affidavit asserting that he told Mr. Steveley to file an appeal
and he failed to do so.

(R., pp.116-117.)

Mr. Steveley asserts that he was not

instructed to file an appeal. (R., pp.126-127.) In the instant case, the operative facts
are in dispute. Additionally, a probable inference that could be drawn from the evidence
presented to the district court is that Mr. Salinas told Mr. Steveley's staff to do
something about his sentence, which could have included an appeal. (Tr.03/07/2013,
p.12, Ls.12-20.)
determination.

Without the hearing, the court could not make a credibility

Yakovac, supra, does not support a conclusion to resolve the factual

dispute without a hearing. The district court applied an incorrect standard when it did
not construe the disputed facts in Mr. Salinas' favor. Without an evidentiary hearing, the
district court could not have resolved the dispute. In light of Mr. Salinas' assertions, the
district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim without an evidentiary hearing
because he has submitted sufficient evidence that a genuine issue of material fact
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exists as to whether Mr. Steveley had been instructed to file an appeal on Mr. Salinas'
behalf.

3.

Material Issue Of Fact Exists On Whether Mr. Salinas Rendered
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To Consult With Mr. Salinas
About His Appeal

The United States Supreme Court has held that it is not always deficient
performance to fail to consult with a client about whether to file an appeal.
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000).

Roe v.

Prevailing professional standards establish that

the decision of whether to file an appeal is ultimately to be made by the defendant, not
the attorney. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function,
(3d ed. 1991), Defense Function, Standard 4-5.2(a)(v). Counsel has a constitutionally
imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to
think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because
there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant
reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. Roe, 528 U.S.
at 480. To "consult" with a defendant regarding filing an appeal has "a specific meaningadvising the defendant about the advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal,
and making a reasonable effort to discover the defendant's wishes." Id. at 478. The
United States Supreme Court expects that courts applying this test "will find, in the vast
majority of cases, that counsel had a duty to consult with the defendant about an
appeal." Id. at 481 .
Mr. Salinas submits that his attorney had a duty to consult with him under either
test.

First, a rational defendant would want to appeal the sentence imposed.

Mr. Salinas received a substantial sentence, twenty years and, although the fixed time
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was five years less than recommended by the State, it is still substantial (five years).
(Tr.09/15/2011, p.2, Ls.12-14; R., pp.5-6.) However, even assuming that this court is
uncomfortable concluding that a rational defendant would want to appeal his sentence,
a material issue of fact remains that Mr. Salinas reasonably demonstrated to counsel
that he was interested in appealing.

According to the register of actions of the

underlying criminal case (attached as Appendix A), the Rule 35 motion was filed the
same day as the judgment of conviction was filed, a clear indication that someone, i.e.,
Mr. Salinas, was not satisfied with the sentence imposed. The evidence presented by
the State demonstrated that on November 14, 2012, Mr. Salinas was dissatisfied with
the sentence imposed and contacted the public defender's office. (R, p.126.) If a client
immediately seeks some relief from the sentence, the attorney, at a minimum has a duty
to consult with the defendant to determine if the defendant wants to appeal the court's
decision. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Mr. Steveley should
have understood that Mr. Salinas was interested in appealing, triggering his duty to
consult with Mr. Salinas.

There is no evidence that Mr. Steveley discussed with

Mr. Salinas the advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal or made a
reasonable effort to discover Mr. Salinas' wishes.

See Roe, 528 U.S. at 478.

Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether trial counsel rendered
deficient performance when he failed to consult with Mr. Salinas about filing an appeal,
and therefore, the matter should be remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.
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4.

Mr. Salinas Was Prejudiced By Mr. Steveley Failures Because Mr. Salinas
Was Deprived Of Counsel At A Critical Stage Of The Proceedings And
Denied Appellate Proceedings Altogether

When an attorney renders deficient performance by failing to file a requested
notice of appeal or by failing to properly consult with the defendant about an appeal,
and that failure results in the forfeiture of an appeal, "counsel's deficient performance
has deprived respondent of more than a fair judicial proceeding; that deficiency
deprived respondent of the appellate proceeding altogether." Roe, 528 U.S. at 482-83.
The denial of counsel during a critical stage and the resulting denial of an entire judicial
proceeding "demands a presumption of prejudice." Id.
Taking Mr. Salinas' factual assertions as true, prejudice is presumed in this
instance. There is a genuine issue of material fact, which, if resolved in Mr. Salinas'
favor, would entitle Mr. Salinas to relief such that the district court erred when it
summarily dismissed this claim.

II.
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Find That Mr. Salinas Submitted Admissible
Evidence For Consideration Of His Claims

A

Introduction
The district court erred discrediting all of Mr. Salinas's pleadings. Because there

are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Mr. Salinas received ineffective
assistance of counsel, Mr. Salinas respectfully requests that the district court's order
summarily dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel claims be vacated, and this
case remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.

18

B.

The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Salinas' Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief Because Mr. Salinas Produced Sworn Pleadings
Constituting Admissible Evidence To Support His Claims
The district court discredited all of Mr. Salinas' evidence when ruling on the

motion for summary dismissal. (R., p.133.) First, the district court erroneously found
that, "The Petitioner did not file an affidavit with his petition to support his conclusory
allegation." (R., p.133.) Then the court erred in concluding that Mr. Salinas failed to
assert the facts in his petition to be true and correct as required by Idaho Code § 194902. (R., p.133, n.2.)

Then, the court discredited Mr. Salinas' affidavit drafted by his

attorney.

Finally, the court concluded that Mr. Salinas presented no

(R., p.133.)

admissible evidence for consideration of his claims. (R., pp.133-134.)
Mr. Salinas asserts the district court erred in discrediting and ignoring all of his
evidence and has misapplied the standard for reviewing summary dismissal motions.
He contends he filed a verified petition, affidavits, pleadings, documents, and records
that all support his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Idaho code section 19-4902 provides, in part:
A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the
applicant with the clerk of the district court in which the conviction took
place .... Facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant and the
authenticity of all documents and exhibits included in or attached to the
application must be sworn to affirmatively as true and correct. The
supreme court may prescribe the form of the application and verification.l5l
I.C. § 19-4902 (emphasis added). Idaho Code§ 19-4903 provides:

5

The verification provided by the Idaho Supreme Court is as follows: "I, _ _ _ _ _ ,
being duly sworn upon my oath, depose and say that I have subscribed to the foregoing
petition; that I know the contents thereof; and that the matters and allegations therein
set forth are true." Idaho Criminal Rule 57. The verification utilized by Mr. Salinas is
sufficiently comparable and contains the key language "true and correct" as required by
the statute. I.C. § 19-4902.
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The application shall identify the proceedings in which the applicant was
convicted, give the date of the entry of the judgment and sentence
complained of, specifically set forth the grounds upon which the
application is based, and clearly state the relief desired. Facts within the
personal knowledge of the applicant shall be set forth separately from
other allegations of facts and shall be verified as provided in section 194902. Affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations shall
be attached to the application or the application shall recite why they are
not attached. The application shall identify all previous proceedings,
together with the grounds therein asserted, taken by the applicant to
secure relief from his conviction or sentence. Argument, citations, and
discussion of authorities are unnecessary.
I.C. § 19-4903 (emphasis added).
"A verified pleading that sets forth evidentiary facts within the personal
knowledge of the verifying signator is in substance an affidavit, and is accorded the
same probative force as an affidavit." Mata, 124 Idaho at 593. In Mata, the petitioner
verified the petition consistent with Idaho Code § 19-4902. Id. at 593. He swore that
the application was "true and correct." Id. Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the State's argument that the petitioner failed to support his application with an
affidavit as contemplated by the statute was without merit. Id.
In this case, Mr. Salinas signed his petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.7.)
He made an oath and had the oath notarized. (R., p.7.) The oath provided, "I am the
Petitioner herein. I have read the enclosed Petition for Post Conviction Relief. I know
the contents thereof and believe them to be true and correct to the best of my belief."
(R., p.7.) The petition set out the evidentiary facts that were within Mr. Salinas' personal

knowledge. He swore the information to be "true and correct." (R., p.7.) This is the
exact language Idaho Code § 19-4902 utilizes.
constitute an affidavit. See Mata, 124 Idaho at 593.
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Thus, his petition is sufficient to

In his petition, Mr. Salinas stated, "Counsel was ineffective when he did not seek
to file an appeal of the sentence imposed; nor did he even speak to me regarding the
possibility of filing an appeal of the sentence imposed."

(R., pp.6-7.)

Therefore,

Mr. Salinas asserted two things in his affidavit. First, the trial attorney did not file an
appeal to challenge the sentence imposed. (R., pp.6-7.) Second, the trial attorney did
not consult with Mr. Salinas about appealing. (R., pp.6-7.) There is nothing more for
Mr. Salinas to add or elaborate. These facts are in his knowledge and he has verified
the facts to be true and correct.
Mr. Salinas attempted to elaborate on his claim in the Petitioner's Response to
Motion for Summary Dismissal, filed November 15, 2012. (R., pp.86-93.) Mr. Salinas
attempted to point out the errors in the State's argument in that an attorney could be
ineffective for failing to consult with his client about filing an appeal.

(R., pp.90-92.)

Again, Mr. Salinas asserts in this response, his attorney failed to consult with him about
filing an appeal and failed to file an appeal on his behalf. (R., pp.90-92.) (Asserting, "as
counsel did not speak to the Petitioner about filing an appeal" and "Counsel did not file
an appeal of the sentence imposed.")

Filing the pleadings pro se, Mr. Salinas

attempted to swear to the accuracy of his statements. (R., p.93.) The asserted facts
made in the response are no different than the facts asserted in his petition and should
not have been discredited by the district court.
On February 7, 2013, with the assistance of his attorney, Mr. Salinas filed an
affidavit in support of his claims.

(R., pp.116-117.)

In this affidavit, Mr. Salinas

asserted, "Immediately after my sentencing hearing I asked my attorney to appeal and
file a motion to reduce my sentence." (R., p.116.) Mr. Salinas asserted that he was
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sworn under oath, which indicated that the contents of the affidavit are true and correct.
(R., p.116.) He signs the affidavit and it is notarized. (R., p.116.) This document is

evidence pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 19-4902 and 4903 and should not have been
discredited by the district court.
Therefore, a verified petition may be sufficient to meet the requirements of
I.C. § 19-4903. Id. According to I.C. § 19-4903, an applicant need not argue its facts,
use citations to support its facts, or discuss any authority to support its factual
contention of the errors made in the applicant's case. The applicant must present facts
within the applicant's personal knowledge. I.C. § 19-4903. An applicant may support
the petition with affidavits, records, or other evidence.

I.C. § 19-4903.

Here,

Mr. Salinas provided a verified petition constituting an affidavit. He made assertion of
facts from his personal knowledge and swore those facts to be true and correct. He
provided a response which reiterated the previous assertions, and he again attempted
to assert the facts as true and correct.

He filed an affidavit prepared by his attorney

taking an oath that the assertions made in the pleading were true and correct.
Therefore, Mr. Salinas did provide admissible evidence to be considered for his claims. 6

As an aside, the district court gave significant weight to Craig Steveley's Affidavit
although it lacked significant assertions of truth, more-so than any of Mr. Salinas's
documents. In the Steveley Affidavit, the attorney asserted at the beginning of the
document that he is "sworn." There is no assertion what he is sworn to do, such as, to
tell the truth. Additionally, the document is simply notarized with no affirmation. The
notarization does nothing more than to indicate that the person that signed the affidavit
is Craig Steveley. The court's attempt to give all weight to this "affidavit" and none to
Mr. Salinas' affidavit based on incorrect affirmations, verifications, or notarizations is
disturbing.
6
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111.
Assuming That Mr. Salinas' Documents Lacked Sufficient Affirmation, The District
Court's Decision To Dismiss The Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Based On This
Rationale Should Be Reversed Because Mr. Salinas Lacked Any Notice That The
District Court Would Be Ignoring His Evidence Based On This Reason, And Therefore,
The Petition Was Dismissed On A Basis For Which He Had No Notice

A.

Introduction
Mr. Salinas asserts that the district court dismissed his petitions on a basis for

which he was not given any notice, by either the State or the district court. As such,
Mr. Salinas was not afforded any notice of the reason for dismissal, and was also
denied an opportunity to respond and attempt to cure any alleged defects in his petition.

B.

Mr. Salinas Received No Notice That The District Court Was Dismissing His
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief On The Basis That His Petition, Affidavit, And
Other Evidence Were Not Sufficiently Certified To Be Admissible
The UPCPA allows the district court to summarily dismiss a petition for post-

conviction relief on its own motion or in response to the State's motion.

I.C. § 19-

4906(b) & (c). In either case, though, the petitioner must be given prior notice of the
specific reason(s) for dismissal, as well as an opportunity to respond. I.C. § 19-4906(b);

see Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322 (1995); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho
156, 159-60 (Ct. App. 1986); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 1995).
The purpose of this requirement is to give the petitioner an opportunity to challenge the
decision before it is finalized. Baruth, 110 Idaho at 159-60. Thus, this requirement is
strict; it makes no difference whether the petitioner's claims are meritorious or not.

Cherniwchan v. State, 99 Idaho 128, 129-30 (1978). A case may not be dismissed on
grounds for which the petitioner received no notice. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671,
676 (2010) (the court's notice was inadequate, however, the district court erred when it
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failed to summarily dismiss the petition on grounds asserted by the State in its motion
for summary dismissal).

An assertion that the petitioner received no notice of the

reasons for dismissal may be asserted for the first time on appeal. See Kelly v. State,

149 Idaho 517, 522 (2010).
In the instant case, Mr. Salinas received no notice that the district court as
discredited all of his affidavits, petitions, and other evidence because an improper
affirmation had been provided. Had the district court or the State provided notice of the
improper affirmation, the problem could have been easily remedied by Mr. Salinas and
his attorney.

Failure to give notice, deprived Mr. Salinas of any real opportunity to

respond. Therefore, this Court should remand the matter for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Salinas respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 13th day of January, 2014.

· NE M. WALKER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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Cases for:

Salinas, Arturo
Ada

6 Cases Found.
State of Idaho vs. Arturo Salinas
No hearings scheduled
CR-FE-2011District
Judge: D~rl_a S.
Amount$ 2 409 _60 Closed pending
Case: 0011897
Williamson
due:
'
clerk action
Charges: Violation Date Charge
Citation Degree Disposition
Felony Finding: Guilty
08/03/2011 I18-907(1)(A)
Battery-Aggravated
Disposition
(Cause Great Bodily
date: 11/10/2011
Harm or Disability)
Fines/fees: $225.50
Credited time (Yes):
Officer: Ada Co
Officer-Generic,, AD
130 days
Det Penitentiary: 5
years
Indet Penitentiary: 15
years
08/03/2011119-2520
Enhancement-Use of a
Deadly Weapon in
Commission of a
Felony
Officer: Ada Co
Officer-Generic,, AD

Felony
Finding: Guilty
Disposition
date: 11/10/2011
Fines/fees: $0.00

Register
of
Date
actions:
08/04/2011 New Case Filed - Felony
08/04/2011 Prosecutor assigned Julianne Meehan
08/04/2011 Hearing Scheduled (Video Arraignment 08/04/2011 01:30 PM)
0810412011

Hearing ~esult for Vi?eo Arraignment scheduled on 08/04/2011 01:30
PM: Arraignment/ First Appearance

08/04/2011 Order Appointing Public Defender Ada County Public Defender
08/04/2011 Judge Change: Administrative
08/04/2011 Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 08/17/2011 08:30 AM)
BOND SET: at 300000.00 - (I18-907(1)(A) Battery-Aggravated (Cause
0810412011
Great Bodily Harm or Disability))
08/04/2011 Order Appointing Public Defender
08/04/2011 Order Appointing Public Defender
08/05/2011 Notification of Penalties for Escape
08/10/2011 Motion For Bond Reduction
08/10/2011 Notice Of Hearing
08/10/2011 Defendant's Request for Discovery
Hear!ng result for Preliminary scheduled on 08/17/2011 08:30 AM:
Hearing Held
Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on 08/17/2011 08:30 AM:
0811712011
Bound Over (after Prelim)
08/17/2011 Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 09/01/2011 09:00 AM)
0811712011

08/17/2011 Commitment
08/19/2011 Motion to Consolidate/FE-2011-10039
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08/22/2011 Information
Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 09/01/2011 09:00 AM:
09/01/2011 District Court Arraignment- Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff Number of
Pages: Less than 100
09/01/2011 Hearing Scheduled (Entry of Plea 09/15/2011 08:30 AM)
09/01/2011 Order to Consolidate (with CRFEll-10039)
Hearing result for Entry of Plea scheduled on 09/15/2011 08:30 AM:
09/15/2011 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff Number of
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100
09/15/2011 Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 11/03/2011 10:00 AM)
0911512011 A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (l18-907(1)(A) Battery-Aggravated
(Cause Great Bodily Harm or Disability))
0911512011 A Plea is entere~ for char~e: - GT (119-2520 Enhancement-Use of a
Deadly Weapon in Comm1ss1on of a Felony)
09/15/2011 Guilty Plea Advisory
0911512011 Order for Pre-Sentence Investigation Report and Mental Health
Assessment
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 11/03/2011 10:00 AM:
11/03/2011 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff Number of
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100
11/03/2011 Hearing Scheduled (Disposition 11/10/2011 10:00 AM)
Hearing result for Disposition scheduled on 11/10/2011 10:00 AM:
11/10/2011 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff Number of
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100
ll/l0/ 2011 Finding of Guilty (l18-907(1)(A) Battery-Aggravated (Cause Great
Bodily Harm or Disability))
Sentenced to Jail or Detention (l18-907(1)(A) Battery-Aggravated
ll/l0/ 2011 (Cause Great Bodily Harm or Disability)) Confinement terms: Credited
time: 130 days. Penitentiary determinate: 5 years. Penitentiary
indeterminate: 15 years.
ll/l0/ 2011 Sentenced To Pay Fine 225.50 charge: l18-907(1)(A) BatteryAggravated (Cause Great Bodily Harm or Disability)
11/10/2011 Order for Restitution and Judgment
ll/l0/ 2011 Findin~ o'. Guilty (119-2520 Enhancement-Use of a Deadly Weapon in
Comm1ss1on of a Felony)
11/10/2011 STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action
ll/l0/ 2011 No Contact Order: Criminal No Contact Order Filed Expiration Days:
7305 Expiration Date: 11/10/2031
11/10/2011 Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's office. 658. 74 victim # 1
ll/l0/ 2011 ~estitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's office. 1296.67 victim #
11/15/2011 Judgment & Commitment
11/15/2011 Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and for Leave
12/01/2011 Objection to Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and For Leave
12/07/2011 Order Denying Motion to Reduce Sentence

CR-FE-2011-

Case: 0010039

State of Idaho vs. Arturo Salinas
No hearings scheduled
t
t
David E.
Amount$O 00
.
M ag1s ra e Ju d ge: Day
due:
•

Charges: Violation Date Charge

07/03/2011 I18-907(1)(A)

Citation Degree

Felony

Closed
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Finding: Dismissed
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